BACKGROUND ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, DISPARATE
IMPACT LIABILIT Y, AND EQUALIT Y The broader context 5 of employment discrimination law and the American legal system's approach to equality within which GINA was enacted is useful for understanding 1 how and why GINA's disparate impact liability exclusion is both significant and a serious legislative shortcoming. 6 Prior to GINA, employment nondiscrimination was advanced via Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 7 Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 8 and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). 9 Claims for unfair employment discrimination under Title VII 10 may be brought under theories of disparate treatment and disparate impacts. 11 In 1971 the Supreme Court clarified in Griggs v Duke Power Co. that Congress had intended for Title VII to stop 'not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation '. 12 Similar burden-shifting frameworks are used to prove claims based on disparate treatment 13 or disparate impact. 14 When an employee makes a prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination, the employer may avoid liability if the challenged practice or policy is 'job related' and consistent with a 'business necessity' (ie there is no alternative policy or practice available that could, without the discriminatory effects, achieve the employer's legitimate goals 15 ). During the Reagan administration and with the reshaped Supreme Court in the 1980s, disparate impact theory was weakened, 16 and Congress specifically responded to the judicial activism with passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to clarify its enduring intent to prohibit both forms of discrimination. 17 In 1994, during the Clinton administration, the Attorney General 18 issued a memo to all administrative agencies explaining, Opponents have produced 'manufactured tension' between disparate treatment and disparate impact theories. 22 This tension-pitting disparate treatment, framed as intentional and direct discrimination, against disparate impacts, framed as unintentional and merely indirect effects-is, in part, due to varying conceptualizations of equality itself.
23
Under formal equality, differences are to be disregarded and treatment the same. Accordingly, formal equality focuses on an anticlassification principle. Because any classification or deviation from same treatment is considered suspect, a formal model of equality makes it difficult to impose any remedial measures, such as affirmative action. One scholar has lamented, 'adherence to formal equality has seemingly eclipsed our moral and political aspirations for social justice'. 24 Others have described formal equality as necessary but insufficient 25 and 'an empty vessel that other normative values must 'fill' by dictating which traits to forbid'.
26
Under substantive equality, however, the fundamental principle is nonsubordination. 27 Ignoring differences (rather than valuing difference) is seen a shortcoming of formal equality, as treating differently situated individuals the same could perpetuate inequality rather than remedy it. Substantive equality models, thus, would have the law question the basis of perceived sameness and difference so that appropriate inclusionary, antidiscrimination measures can be taken in any given 19 context. 28 Whereas a formal equality model adopts 'blindness' toward off-limits categories or forbidden classifications, a substantive equality model adopts a 'consciousness' of historical privilege, oppression, and vulnerabilities. The latter model would allow differential treatment that challenges or seeks to correct the historical oppression (including reasonable accommodations and diversity initiatives). Disparate impact liability is part of a substantive equality model, 'values merit, and questions only whether employers have too quickly seized on employment practices that assess merit only imperfectly, and at considerable cost to...equality of opportunity'.
29
While a formal equality model has dominated the law in the United States, 30 substantive equality and non-subordination principles have been considered the foundation of employment discrimination law (at least until relatively recently). 31 It is within this broader context that GINA's disparate impact liability exclusion and departure from non-subordination principles must be viewed.
THE VAGUE LEGISL ATIVE HISTORY FOR GINA'S DISPARATE IMPACT
LIABILIT Y E XCLUSION How the disparate impact liability exclusion became part of the legislation remains somewhat of a mystery. While there were five congressional hearings 32 (see Table 1 ) held prior to the insertion of the provision that would limit employer liability for disparate impacts (see Table 2 ), there was no discussion on the record regarding whether neutral employment policies with discriminatory effects (ie disparate impacts) would be banned along with disparate treatment. Even during the two congressional hearings held after its insertion, 33 the topic was not covered sufficiently on the record. 34 In 2007 there were two brief remarks on the record signaling that business and trade lobbyists 28 Illustrations are often useful in distinguishing these models. See eg the 'Equality Versus Equity' meme attributed to Lee Constable in Craig Froehle, The Evolution of an Accidental Meme, Medium, Apr. 14, 2016. https://medium.com/@CRA1G/the-evolution-of-an-accidental-meme-ddc4e139e0e4 (last accessed July 30, 2018). 29 Rosenthal, supra note 5, at 2202. 30 (such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce) were trying to narrow the bill's scope in any way possible and, as the bill moved closer to passage, the discussion homed in on ensuring that with this legislation Congress was targeting 'intentional and deliberate discrimination' rather than an 'accidental' violation. 35 The deliberations over GINA took place genetic variant. Twice 'disparate impact' was mentioned merely to express support with the provision already contained within S.1053 to establish a commission, and twice 'disparate impact' was referenced to highlight the protections for genetic discrimination that might be possible under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 if the employer's action or policy under scrutiny has created disparate impacts on the basis of race, sex, religion, and national origin once in the record for the two congressional hearings held after the provision appeared in the legislation. Table 3 ). The early genetic nondiscrimination bills never even made it to the floor for a vote while the Republicans controlled Congress. By the time the Democrats regained control of Congress with the 2006 mid-term elections, it is not surprising that they would strategically choose to advance the compromised bill that had already been endorsed by President George W. Bush rather than revisiting the text to remove this limitation on liability and jeopardize the bipartisan support it had gained thus far or risk a potential presidential veto. Committee reports 36 similarly lack detail regarding how the Committee on Health, Employment, Labor, and Pensions (HELP) arrived, after the 2002 hearing, at its compromise that led to the introduction of a unified bipartisan bill. 37 The compromise 38 made between the Republican 39 and Democratic 40 versions of the bill ultimately weakened the legislation by narrowing the employers who would be subject to the legislation's restrictions, removing the direct cause of action as an enforcement mechanism, and limiting the available remedies for a violation. The HELP Committee noted in 2003, Due to the unique nature of genetic information and our current understanding of this developing area of science, the Committee has determined that only disparate treatment cases should be permitted under this legislation at this time. 41 Yet it is unclear, and unstated, what led the Committee to this determination, as there is no documentation addressing why facially neutral policies with discriminatory effects on the basis of genetic information would be outside the reach of this law when it was expressly designed as a civil rights statute similar to Title VII, which allows liability for disparate impacts on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin unless the policy is job related and for a business necessity, 42 and the ADA, which allows for liability for disparate impacts on the basis of disability. 45 The EEOC further explained that the proposed rule did not address the study commission 'which is scheduled to begin its work on May 21, 2014'. 46 While the EEOC expressly sought public comment that would go beyond the confines of the proposed rule, 47 only three dozen (N = 36) written comments were submitted. 48 Interestingly, only one comment-submitted by Jeffery Norris on behalf of the Equal Employment Advisory Council and the HR Policy Association-addressed disparate impact liability, having noted the organizations 'fully support' the proposed exclusion at Section 1635.5(b). 49 The Final Rule was issued by the EEOC six months later without change to the preamble discussion or relevant section. 50 Major news coverage is also unhelpful in clarifying the matter. Between the date the first genetic nondiscrimination bill was introduced (April 23, 1995) and the date GINA was signed into law (May 21, 2008), there were only 34 relevant articles in five major U.S. newspapers (the Chicago Tribune, Los Angeles Times, New York Times, Wall Street Journal, and Washington Post) (see Table 4 ). None of the articles mentioned 'disparate impact'. Only one of the articles even mentioned-albeit without specific explanation-why the Senate version of the bill with the disparate impact liability exclusion provision was pursued rather than the versions without that provision: Aaron Zitner reported, Rep . Louise McIntosh Slaughter (D-N.Y.) said violators would face tougher penalties under a bill she filed in the House, which as 221 co-sponsors, including 44 Republicans. But Slaughter said she would urge House members to approve the Senate bill rather than her own to ease its passage into law.
51
After reviewing the legislative history, it seems reasonable to conclude that the exclusion of disparate impact liability from the genetic nondiscrimination legislation was not a carefully deliberated decision based on actual congressional findings of fact or strong policy justifications. Rather, the feature was viewed as an improvement upon earlier versions because of (1) the ongoing challenges that legislators had in navigating the scientific concepts while drafting workable definitions for the legislation (such what 'genetic information' would be protected); (2) inflated, but frequently repeated, concerns voiced by legislation's opponents that potential conflicting regulatory obligations and inadvertent acquisitions of genetic information would open the floodgates to employer liability; 52 and (3) the desire to message this prophylactic legislation as both sufficiently narrow and urgently needed. 49 As the President said in his radio address on this issue last June, any legislation seeking to protect against genetic discrimination must be 'fair, reasonable, and consistent with existing discrimination statutes.' From that perspective, I feel it is imperative that any proposed legislation in this area focus on prohibiting discriminatory conduct, rather than prohibiting the flow of information. He elaborated to note the 'difficulty of regulating the flow of information between two individuals in the workplace" and warned of a "Pandora's box of regulatory nightmares' given how ADA, FMLA, and workers' compensation rules require extensive documentation of medical information that might, depending on how the legislation is drafted, create conflicting obligations for employers. remedies are the best way to ensure compliance...' 54 and while the fervent opposition was mainly directed at (1) the proposed private cause of action in the health insurance discrimination provisions 55 and (2) the ability to seek judicial relief without exhausting administrative process first, disparate impact liability was nixed from the unified bill. The exclusion remained absent, however, from the House version until the 109th Congress.
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When this legislative history is viewed within the broader context of employment discrimination law, it is hard to refute that GINA's disparate impact liability exclusion was the latest tactic used by Republicans in their protracted effort to pull the United States back from substantive equality and to dismantle disparate impact liability in employment (and other areas of) law. The Democrats' willingness to give up, at least temporarily, on disparate impact liability is aligned with the possibility that they saw gaining formal equality nondiscrimination protections for genetic information as better than nothing at all (ie GINA's protections were necessary but insufficient).
CONGRESS'S UNFINISHED BUSINESS
Regardless of how or why it arrived, the disparate impact liability exclusion became law when GINA was passed in 2008, as did the rest of Section 208 that contained the plans that Congress revisit whether disparate impact liability should be enabled after commission issued a report with recommendations. Notably, Section 208 was not drafted as optional. Rather, the plain language of Section 208 was such that the study commission's establishment was springing or, in other words, automatic (ie upon the sixth anniversary of GINA on May 21, 2014, the commission was established regardless of whether any members were appointed in advance); 57 the eight appointments of members were eight distinct statutory obligations, not merely permissions for the specified offices (as evinced by repetition of the words 'shall be appointed' when describing the authority of each office to appoint a member to the commission); 58 and the work product to be delivered was subject to a hard deadline so the commission could not continue or be at impasse indefinitely (as indicated by 'not later than 1 year after all of the members are appointed'). 59 These obligations, however, were perhaps illusory: who could lawfully or would politically hold those charged with the statutory obligation to appoint a member to the study commission accountable for failing to do so? To date, there is no information readily available to indicate that any member of Congress enumerated in GINA as obligated to appoint a member to the commission has done so. Nor is there information readily available to indicate that the Genetic Nondiscrimination Study Commission has commenced work or delivered the requisite report. If complying with the letter of GINA, the appointments to the commission are now more than four years overdue. Unfortunately, GINA contains no citizen suit provision 61 that would allow private citizens the ability to compel performance by the enumerated members of Congress (see Table 5 ) or, alternatively, the commission envisioned by Section 208.
DISPARATE IMPACT LIABILIT Y FOR GENETIC DISCRIMINATION
IN EMPLOYMENT AND BEYOND It is relevant, perhaps, to note that nondiscrimination is not necessarily synonymous with antidiscrimination. 62 One could argue that the former is passive (an observation of absence) and the other active (a counterbalancing force). In that sense, a nondiscrimination approach does not go as far as an antidiscrimination approach would or should. GINA purports to be a forward-looking statute but does so in perhaps the most myopic 63 way possible. Perhaps given the law's name involving nondiscrimination (rather than antidiscrimination, fairness, or equality), it should not be a surprise that it deviates significantly from the employment discrimination statutes that preceded it (Title VII, ADA, and ADEA). As other scholars have observed, 64 those preceding statutes were all focused on non-subordination (even if they have included anticlassification aspects) in that they allowed disparate impact liability, allowed affirmative action as remedial measures, and required reasonable accommodations. Looking at nonsubordination and substantive equality is what 'tells us where GINA falls short." 65 Much of previous scholarship on GINA as a nondiscrimination law has centered on the fact that pre-GINA employment discrimination statutes were retrospective and trying to correct historical oppression of groups and that GINA is different, in part, because society has not recognized, stigmatized, marginalized, or oppressed 'a visible underclass' 66 -or individuals have not yet developed obvious 'genetic identities' similar to our racial/ethnic, gender, and (dis)abled identities. 67 GINA's preemptive approach has been viewed as distinctive, and GINA's mandated privacy practices to As per Section 208(c) of GINA, each of the offices listed below (regardless of the individual who held that office) was to appoint one member to the study commission.
promote nondiscrimination have been viewed by some as a means to benefit everyone, regardless of any 'genetic identities'.
68
Preventing the 'insidious creation of a genetic underclass that is denied participation in the liberal economy' 69 requires us to go beyond genomic sequence data, beyond disparate treatment liability, and beyond the employment context. GINA establishes an indefinite number of protected classes and asserts that use of genetic information is always an unfair basis upon which to make employment decisions intentionally. By not enabling disparate impact liability, however, victims only have legal remedy if they can demonstrate the employer's use of pretext or mixed motives 70 and countless genetic underclasses could persist or expand. Moreover, GINA was already severely limited in scope by not anticipating and staving off numerous potential genetic underclasses in education, housing, lending, commerce, federally funded or run programs, and other opportunities.
Since GINA's passage in 2008, genetic science and technologies have developed and expanded, and the number of individuals having their genomes analysed-whether clinically, as part of participation in research, or through direct-toconsumer options-has increased dramatically. The personal genomics industry continues to grow, and gaining access to genomic information is becoming easier for individuals in the United States. 71 However, public awareness of GINA remains low, and there has been relatively little GINA litigation. 72 While the Affordable Care Act has rendered GINA Title I protections moot by expanding health insurance nondiscrimination rights, 73 GINA Title II remains valuable legislation to protect individuals' genetic privacy and nondiscrimination rights in the workplace. 74 It is important for legislation to keep up with the pace of the technology, meet the emerging challenges, and close gaps in legal nondiscrimination protections once discovered.
Congress has unfinished business, and scholars in relevant fields (including but not limited to genetics, bioinformatics, anthropology, sociology, biomedical science, etc.) must conduct empirical and normative research that could inform the policy work not yet completed. After 10 years of GINA and countless developments in genomics and informatics, it is time to revisit disparate impact liability and to do so with a progressive eye not only toward genetic information but also other 'big data'. The Genetic Nondiscrimination Study Commission should be empaneled and commence work to issue a report as soon as possible. Among the many issues the commission and Congress should consider is that fairness and equality in the future will require a more progressive vision than passive approaches that prohibit only overt discrimination. With genetics, statistical discrimination is a substantial problem: linkage disequilibrium means that many (of not most) 'neutral' policies based on manifested traits and conditions that could themselves be job-related would create one or more genetic underclasses that we as a society would not want to create. One way to promote substantive equality would be for Congress to incentivize the documentation of antidiscrimination measures 75 taken by employers to ensure that not only are practices and policies free from overt, intentional genetic discrimination but also proactively designed to minimize discriminatory effects. Another topic ripe for study by the commission is whether and how an employer's failure to prevent disparate impacts might give rise to an inference of disparate treatment. 76 With advances in big data and informatics, it is increasingly difficult to rely on categories as 'protected classes', because the increased granularity with which data can be segmented enables extensive discrimination on levels that would evade identification as a visible underclass. If disparate impact liability is not available and a return to non-subordination principles is not taken to promote equality, it will be increasingly difficult to enforce the current civil rights laws, including but not limited to GINA. A disparate impact claim would be one in which a neutral employment policy (ie a policy that is not explicitly based on genetic information) nevertheless has disproportionate effects on groups of individuals based on genetic information. This could potentially be the most important type of nondiscrimination protections for individuals who, despite not expressing a trait or being symptomatic, have heightened genetic risks for conditions with incomplete penetrance and variable expressivity. This also could potentially be the most important type of genetic nondiscrimination protection when one views genetics through an omnigenic model of phenotypic variation. 77 Policymakers will increasingly need assistance from the scientific community to understand where an appropriate line is to be drawn between fair and unfair genetic discrimination.
